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INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides new insight into Antonio de Viti de Marco’s (1936) 
interpretation of David Ricardo’s (1817) equivalence theorem, for which 
Robert Barro (1974) provides a modern restatement, holding that an 
extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. There is a superficial 
similarity between the two theorists. At a deeper level of examination, 
however, the two theorists diverge sharply. In this respect, de Viti and 
Ricardo resemble the two parabolas X2 and −X2: they share a common 
origin but point their analytical attention in opposing directions. Ricardo 
reasoned in terms of macro aggregates and then reduced that aggregate to 
a representative individual. Within this framework, public debt must be 
self-extinguishing because Ricardo’s representative individual framework 
prevents an individual from defaulting on himself. The self-extinction of 
public debt is a built-in feature of Ricardo’s purely abstract model where 
what was in play was a simple matter of double-entry accounting, in which 
case an extraordinary tax and a public loan must have equivalent present 
value.
While de Viti accepted Ricardo’s aggregative arithmetic, he regarded this 
arithmetic as a truism that obscured the individual actions and interactions 
that were occurring at the micro level of action. What de Viti called the 
cooperative state was but one possible model of political economy that 
provided more of an analytical foil than a reasonable theory of political-
economic experience, as Michele Giuranno and Manuela Mosca (2016) 
explain in their extensive examination of de Viti’s concern with developing 
realistic models of the state. For de Viti, the cooperative state was actually 
an anti-political model in the spirit of Carl Schmitt’s (1932) recognition of 
the autonomy of the political in society. It is the state reduced wholly to 
contractual obligation under voluntarism. In this limiting case, public debt 
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4 Debt default and democracy
must be self-extinguishing because no one would agree to extend credit to 
someone without believing that the resulting obligation will be met. At the 
level of ex ante expectation, public debt must be self-extinguishing under an 
institutional regime within which all political action is voluntary. To be sure, 
one might doubt whether political action can ever be made wholly volun-
tary, in which case self-extinction gives way to some form of default, not as 
reflected in aggregate variables but as reflected in individual expectations.
It is at this point of individual expectation that de Viti’s analysis diverges 
sharply from Ricardo’s because de Viti recognized that aggregate variables 
are derived from individual interactions that themselves occur within par-
ticular institutional settings that channel power. Hence, public debt will be 
self-extinguishing only as an extreme limiting case. Where self-extinction 
of public debt was built into Ricardo’s model, it was only one possibility 
within de Viti’s model. A model that assumes that all collective action is 
genuinely contractual will necessarily entail self-extinction of public debt. 
But this outcome is an artifact of a particular model and not a general 
feature of reality. Even with a cooperative state model, self-extinction can 
fail if  some share of the debt is held externally. In this situation, members 
of the issuing polity can secure positive wealth gains by defaulting on their 
obligations to outsiders. To be sure, default would undermine the reputa-
tion of the defaulting polity, and so could not serve as a continuing policy. 
All the same, it is worth noting that a gain that lasts but seven years is 
worth about half  as much as one that would last forever if  people discount 
the future at 10 percent. In other words, the prospect of foreclosing long-
term options might be embraced if  the short-term gains of doing so are 
sufficiently attractive. Only if  the loan must be re-purchased by domestic 
taxpayers can default be precluded by theoretical construction.1 Otherwise, 
the prospect of default depends on institutionally governed relationships 
among relevant participants.
Once it is recognized that democratic polities are never fully cooperative, 
there are numerous paths along which public debt can be repudiated in 
whole or in part. For instance, the use of debt to transfer cost from some 
members of a polity to other members is a form of repudiation when 
judged from a contractual perspective. Repudiation can thus arise even 
if  all debt is held internally, though the presence of external debt widens 
the possibilities for repudiation. Once we recognize, as de Viti recognized, 
that democratic states are only incompletely cooperative states, debt will 
not be extinguished as the contractual framework envisions.2 Once it is 
1 See De Viti (1893).
2 It goes without saying that this is in a democratic state, not in a cooperative state where 
defaulting is a clearing transaction only.
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recognized that democratic governments are never fully cooperative, public 
debt becomes a means by which winning groups within the polity transfer 
wealth from losing groups.
DE VITI VS. RICARDO ON THE EQUIVALENCE 
BETWEEN TAXES AND LOANS
From a superficial or aggregative point of view, de Viti and Ricardo make 
similar, if  not identical claims about the equivalence between taxes and 
loans. The equivalence is an accounting identity from the perspective of 
double-entry accounting applied to some closed entity that contains all 
of the participants in the public debt transaction. If  debt transactions are 
wholly contractual, as they are within the presuppositions of the coopera-
tive state, public debt leaves all individual balance sheets unaffected. Public 
debt is not a source of net wealth to any person within the rubric of de Viti’s 
cooperative state. It is easy to see how de Viti could have been described as 
the ‘Italian Ricardo’. For Ricardo, equivalence was treated as an account-
ing identity, as Robert Barro (1974) explains in his well-cited explanation 
of how the issuance of government bonds does not increase aggregate net 
worth, and with Barro’s treatment of Ricardo standing in sharp contrast 
to Keynesian-like claims on behalf  of the stabilizing properties of fiscal 
policy. Subsequent to Barro, a considerable body of literature has arisen 
over Barro’s Ricardian implication about the impotence of fiscal policy. 
Ricardo is an archetypical macro theorist who reasons in terms of global 
aggregates, leaving out of analytical sight the micro details from which 
those aggregates are constituted.
Where Ricardo, like most macro theorists today, theorized in top-down 
fashion whereby changes in macro variables caused micro variables to 
take on the necessary accommodating values, de Viti was a quintessential 
micro theorist. For de Viti, aggregate variables were nothing but statisti-
cal reflections of underlying micro-level interaction. De Viti recognized 
that circumstances could exist wherein an extraordinary tax would be 
equivalent to a public loan, but this equivalence was not a mere accounting 
identity. To the contrary, it was a working property of a particular set 
of institutional arrangements. In particular, these were the institutional 
arrangements associated with de Viti’s model of the cooperative state. With 
respect to the actual conduct of economic life, de Viti (1893) is manifestly 
anti-Ricardian, as is Benvenuto Griziotti (1917).3 It was Buchanan (1958, 
3 For a general view, see Eusepi (1989).
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1960, 1976) who tried to incorporate de Viti’s analysis on public debt into 
the specific doctrinal body of the Italian School of Public Finance, and 
distinguished the Italian tradition from the Anglo-Saxon tradition on 
which the Ricardian equivalence proposition rested.
It is a matter of simple arithmetic to affirm Barro’s (1974) claim that the 
issuance of public debt does not increase aggregate net worth. Suppose 
some volume of taxation is replaced by an equal amount of public debt, 
as an act of Keynesian-like fiscal policy. The decrease in taxation is, taken 
by itself, an increase in disposable income. The concomitant issuance 
of government bonds, however, creates an obligation to increase taxes 
in future years to amortize the debt. At the time the debt is issued, an 
aggregate balance sheet would show no change in net worth. The asset 
labeled ‘disposable income’ is increased, but that increase is offset by an 
increase in the liability denoted ‘taxes payable’. As a matter of the simple 
arithmetic of double-entry accounting, an increase in public debt cannot 
increase aggregate net worth. Such an increase, however, can increase net 
worth for some people while simultaneously decreasing it for other people, 
with this redistribution having much to do with the creation of public debt. 
The validity of this point requires de Viti’s recognition to be embraced that 
macro-level conditions are generated through micro-level interaction, and 
with there being numerous distinct forms that such interaction can take.
Despite Buchanan’s emphasis on the central role that public expenditure 
had in de Viti’s analysis, subsequent Italian scholars mostly failed to extend 
and amplify de Viti’s scheme of non-Ricardian analysis, and embraced 
instead the Ricardian scheme of analysis whereby public debt raises 
macro questions that can be addressed without addressing any underlying 
micro-level questions. For de Viti, however, macro-level statements must 
be reconciled with micro-level actions and interactions. In making this 
reconciliation, de Viti recognized the erroneous character of Ricardo’s 
intertemporal comparison that led Ricardo to conclude that an extra-
ordinary tax and public loan were necessarily equivalent. De Viti recog-
nized that the two could be equivalent, but there was no necessity that they 
actually be equivalent. Ricardo’s analysis was a simple exercise in macro 
aggregation. In contrast, de Viti recognized that macro-level variables 
were emergent by-products of micro-level interactions that were governed 
by some institutional framework that structured those interactions. To 
de Viti, equivalence is a possibility that would arise only if  public and 
private allocations were equally efficient at the relevant margins of activity. 
According to de Viti, the cost has to be analyzed by comparing present and 
future utility and ‘by reasoning on the difference’. This difference, de Viti 
wrote, ‘is the new premise of a new problem so that any reasoning dealing 
with contributed goods only, without considering public goods that are 
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provided or dealing with the utility of public goods without referring to 
costs, would be erroneous’ (1898, p. 114). It is precisely with making this 
mistake that de Viti charges Ricardo.4
To avoid Ricardo’s mistake required de Viti to develop an analytical 
framework that enabled public debt to emerge within some institutionally 
reasonable and plausible system of political economy. De Viti recognized 
that his purely cooperative state was a limiting idealization that was never 
fully realized in democratic political systems. On this point, it is perhaps 
also worth mentioning that de Viti served some 20 years as a member of 
the Italian Parliament, so his work was informed by some conjunction of 
theoretical and practical interests. Michele Giuranno and Manuela Mosca 
(2016) present a careful examination of de Viti’s political realism in this 
respect, which shows that de Viti never confused his limiting ideal of a 
cooperative state with actual democracies. In this respect, de Viti’s (1930) 
collection of essays characterizing 30 years of political struggles shows 
clearly that the cooperative state might stand as some model appropriate 
for the end of history but it was not a reliable guide to understanding the 
course of historical life.
ACTUAL DEMOCRACY AS SEMI-COOPERATIVE 
STATE
While de Viti articulated a model of a cooperative state, his interest in doing 
so created a useful framework for thinking about collective activity in an 
explanatory manner. In this respect, starting from his first work in public 
finance in 1888, de Viti sought to place public finance on an explanatory 
footing, in sharp contrast to the strongly normative or tutorial position it 
had in the hands of most theorists. De Viti’s model of the cooperative state 
brought forward such commonalities of economic organization through 
markets as utility, demand, cost, and organization so as to bring those 
commonalities to bear on the economic organization of collective activity. 
De Viti (1930) was also well aware that actual democratic arrangements 
bore but an imperfect resemblance to his idealized model of the coopera-
tive state.
In actual democratic settings there is no necessity that public debt be 
self-extinguishing. It must be self-extinguishing within the framework of 
the cooperative state, for the state within that framework had the same 
properties of consensual interaction among participants as did a market 
4 The critique that de Viti addresses to Ricardo regarding his exclusion of benefits can be 
extended to the Keynesian theory on costs.
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economy grounded in private property and freedom of contract. Within 
a market economy, personal debt is self-extinguishing, which means that 
personal debt is not an instrument by which a borrower can increase his 
or her net worth, as against postponing redemption of some liabilities, 
and paying for that postponement by paying interest. An individual might 
refuse to discharge a debt, thereby transferring wealth from lender to 
borrower to the extent that refusal is successful. Within actual democratic 
polities there are numerous ways that default and repudiation can be baked 
into the fiscal cake, so to speak. Each of these ways involves one margin or 
another along which the ideal of the wholly cooperative state is violated, 
in which case public debt can become a political instrument that allows 
friends to be rewarded and enemies punished, along the lines that Carl 
Schmitt (1932) set forth in his analysis of the autonomy of the political in 
society. This can happen both with externally held debt and with internally 
held debt.
COOPERATIVE STATE DEFAULT WITH EXTERNAL 
DEBT
By de Viti’s contractual construction of the cooperative state, public debt 
is self-extinguishing; however, this self-extinguishing feature is a product 
of de Viti’s presumption that the transactions that generate public debt are 
confined within the state. De Viti’s pure cooperative model is an in vitro 
construction consisting of a small closed economy with a small – although 
not minimalist – government.5 The extent of politically organized activ-
ity depends on the relative efficiency of public expenditures and private 
expenditures on a project-by-project basis. Under these restrictive condi-
tions, resorting to a public loan is to treat the loan as if  it were an intertem-
poral exchange where the creation of debt is a transaction whereby lenders 
pay current taxes for borrowers, and with those borrowers discharging 
their obligations according to the terms of the debt contract. In de Viti’s 
logic, the public loan is a clearing transaction between each member of the 
cooperative qua producer and each single saver qua consumer. In the end, 
the public loan is a general clearing account where the net value of both 
individual and aggregate transactions is zero.
This situation changes once foreigners can buy debt instruments on 
credit markets. Public debt is no longer confined to the members of a state 
that issues the debt, as some instruments of public debt can be held by 
5 On the minimalist government see Roth (2002).
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foreigners. The opening of the credit market to foreigners can undermine 
the cooperative state by changing the political dynamics inside the issuing 
state. No longer does public debt entail the state acting as an intermediary 
between borrowers and lenders within the state. A foreign subscriber to 
public debt can do so as an investor, reflecting the reach of an international 
market in credit instruments. The existence of such a market, however, can 
bring about the end of the cooperative state because both the automatic 
self-extinction of public debt and the equivalence between debt financing 
and tax financing are undermined by the presence of an international 
credit market which opens a channel of debt default even if  the institu-
tional arrangement of the state promotes internal consensus.
To be sure, de Viti seems to follow a different path, along which he tries 
to extend his cooperative model made up of three individuals with the 
same income but coming from different sources (liquid assets, landowners 
and professionals) to the case of external debt. A brief  outline of this 
model would be appropriate before raising doubt on its feasibility. Let’s 
give an Italian flavor to the narrative and assume that Primus, Secundus 
and Tertius are a landowner, a capitalist and a professional respectively. 
Let’s also assume that Primus and Tertius are taxpayers of the cooperative 
state and Secundus, who is a foreigner and bond subscriber, is a capitalist 
who holds his assets in liquid form. De Viti claims that there is no dif-
ference between two distinct situations. In the closed credit market, the 
capitalist lends his money to Primus and Tertius to pay their tax bills, with 
Secundus paying his tax bill directly to exemplify the equivalence between 
an extraordinary tax and a set of private loans. In the open credit market, 
Secundus buys government-issued bonds, with the state using the proceeds 
to finance state activity in lieu of tax payments by Primus and Tertius.
However ingenious this theoretical construction is, it leaves us puzzled. 
While in the case of an internal debt Secundus pays his tax bill directly, in 
the open market where Secundus is simply a subscriber and not a taxpayer, 
the equivalence between tax and debt vanishes. When the capitalist is a 
foreigner, more complex mechanisms come into play. Unlike the pure 
cooperative model, in this case there is a shortage of internal liquidity since 
the government would be simply unable to levy an extraordinary tax on 
foreigners. The equivalence between tax and debt requires that there be a 
genuine choice possible between the two options. This situation, however, 
is not consistent with market transactions where cooperative relationships 
are absent. It is precisely the fact that Secundus is not a member of the 
cooperative polity that renders invalid the identity between producer 
and consumer on which the cooperative model hinges. As is well known, 
the non-coincidence between producer and consumer is the presupposi-
tion or precondition for the exchange and, hence, also for the exchange 
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between those who lend and those who borrow. This precondition of 
exchange is not an attribute of the cooperative state. It is rather proper for 
a competitive state where incomes are not homogeneous, either intra- or 
inter-generationally.
In the democratic state, government is still an intermediary, as it was 
in de Viti’s cooperative state, save that producers and consumers are 
different individuals and so are taxpayers and bond subscribers. Hence, 
when one moves from a single country setting to an international setting, 
things change dramatically, and differently from what was described in 
the three-individual examples above. International relationships can be 
sketched by two extreme profiles. Let A and B denote the two countries 
under consideration, whose relationships are open to both real exchanges 
and monetary exchanges. In this open market setting, competition does 
not concern only A’s and B’s enterprises, but also the government debt of 
A and B, which have to sell their bonds. Let us imagine that A’s savers find 
bonds offered by B more palatable and accordingly they buy B’s bonds. 
Assuming an extreme case, all A’s savers, or most of them, could buy 
bonds issued by B’s government. This is a likely event in a democratic state 
where savers maximize their expected results and where the cooperative 
state presuppositions cannot be applied. By subscribing B’s bonds, it is 
as if  A’s savers wanted to punish their government, as a sort of voting 
with their feet. However, a punishment on A’s government is not equal 
to a punishment on A’s future generation. And in fact, a punishment on 
government may generate an advantage for A’s future generation. Even in 
the extreme case in which A’s government may default, the future genera-
tion could survive thanks to the accrued interest on B’s bonds owned by 
A’s savers. This point is an interesting one because it shows the limits of a 
position à la Barro where pure altruism allows insulating government from 
international competition.
Mutatis mutandis, we would have the same scenario if  B’s savers did 
not trust their government and bought A’s bonds. On the whole, the two 
alternatives are able to show not only the limits of Barro’s altruism, but 
also the difficulty that one encounters by extending the presuppositions of 
the cooperative state to a democratic setting.
The relevance of the distinction between internal debt and external debt, 
based on the aphorism ‘we owe it to ourselves’, heralded by Abba Lerner 
(1943, 1944), has been under vigorous attack by Buchanan (1958), who 
claims that such a distinction is of a marginal kind since it is contingent 
on the institutional setting. In particular, Buchanan clarifies that resorting 
to an external debt allows a larger national gross income, but once interest 
is deducted, net national income is the same in the two cases. Buchanan’s 
stance is central for also clarifying de Viti’s analysis. International indebt-
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edness turns de Viti’s governments from intermediaries of producers’ 
and consumers’ cooperatives into competitive governments, as political 
enterprises maximizing their own interests. Thinking of canceling competi-
tion between or among governments in order to extend the cooperative 
model to international relationships is, conversely, to give rise to collusive 
relationships where governments are not agents of taxpayers, but rather 
interest groups.
A further clarification is needed here. Intergovernmental competition on 
available savings makes evident how the aphorism ‘we owe it to ourselves’ 
hides competition and ends up by considering the whole debt as it were an 
internal debt. Differently from de Viti, to whom debt extinction may result 
from a generalization or democratization process, Abba Lerner conceives 
of debt as self-extinguished from birth. Hence public debt will never be a 
problem. To de Viti, in contrast, public debt can generate problems of the 
form he associated with economic crises (see de Viti, 1898). In framing 
debt within the general theory of crisis, de Viti emphasizes the evaluation 
mistakes made by the previous generation. But there is a second aspect in 
de Viti’s thought, which we think is more general, that has been ignored by 
the literature. This aspect is linked to the change in preferences over time 
and to the lack of a price mechanism able to quickly capture the disequi-
librium between demand and supply, of which the crisis is the result. Debt 
and crisis intertwine and do not self-extinguish, and may instead lead to 
default.
DEMOCRATIC STATE DEFAULT WITH INTERNAL 
DEBT
The relevant officials within a government that shifts from tax finance 
to loan finance must have concluded that loan finance is less costly from 
their perspective than tax finance. This might well induce those officials 
to support expansions in spending that are wasteful when compared to 
the displaced private alternative activities. If  indebtedness were forbidden, 
those wasteful expenditures would not have occurred. De Viti observes 
that if  this logic regarding public loans were applied to the private loan 
system, an excessive demand for loans would result because entrepreneurs 
would not bear personal liability for their losses. This situation is actually 
not all that far-fetched in contemporary times where many private busi-
nesses receive political support and largesse through loan guarantees and 
subsidies. In numerous ways these days, a good deal of public debt finds its 
way into the support of nominally private enterprises.
Where de Viti’s model of the cooperative state assumes a deep-level 
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homogeneity among the members of the internal polity, de Viti also 
recognized that actual democratic polities contain no such homogeneity. 
Hence, there are numerous margins along which public debt can be used to 
transfer tax burdens from what would have resulted from an extraordinary 
tax. With respect to taxation, de Viti developed his model of the coopera-
tive state under the presumption that public expenditures were normally 
financed by a flat tax on income. The basis on which de Viti made this 
assumption was that the demand for public outputs probably varied in 
proportion to income. While the relation between income and demand is 
ultimately an empirical proposition that can be subject to examination, 
we shall simply accept it here because our interest lies in explaining de 
Viti’s thinking and not in examining the accuracy or plausibility of his 
assumptions. In consequence, we can assume that what de Viti has in mind 
by way of extraordinary taxation is a surtax imposed on a pre-existing flat 
tax. For instance, an ordinary flat rate of 10 percent might be increased 
to 15   percent through the addition of the extraordinary component of 
the tax.
If  there were no public borrowing, it is reasonable to think, as did de 
Viti, that some people would discharge the extraordinary component of 
their tax liability by drawing down their balances on other assets, including 
cash. Other people would just as surely borrow through private credit 
channels. In any event, total government revenues would increase through 
the extraordinary tax, regardless of the extent to which those revenues 
came from sales of privately held assets relative to privately arranged loans. 
Whatever the mix, public involvement would be limited to the collection 
of increased taxes, along with expenditure of those tax revenues. We might 
further stipulate, in keeping with the tenets of de Viti’s cooperative state 
model, that this fiscal operation is agreeable to everyone. There would 
be no public debt, and the private debt induced by the extraordinary tax 
would be self-extinguishing.
Alternatively, suppose that a public loan is issued to finance the 
added public expenditure. In the previous situation, a set of contractual 
obligations is created between a set of private lenders and those taxpayers 
who choose to pay their extraordinary tax by borrowing rather than by 
selling off  other assets. When public debt is created, a governmental entity 
replaces the set of private creditors. Is this replacement a matter of indif-
ference, or might it have significant consequences? There is good reason to 
think it will have significant consequences, and in a way that represents a 
form of debt default. To be sure, default is not limited to some repudiation 
of existing debt instruments. That is but one manner of default. Within 
the framework of the cooperative state, default pertains to any operation 
through which public debt influences individual net worth, regardless 
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of what might happen to some aggregate measure of net worth, for it is 
individual positions and not aggregate measures that induce action.
Earlier we explained that default on external debt could generate an 
increase in net worth for internal citizens. It’s also possible for internal debt 
to redistribute wealth among citizens, in which case those who gain through 
the issue of debt are repudiating their obligations to those who lose from 
the issue of debt. In this instance, the baseline for judging whether default 
has occurred is the set of contractual terms that would have arisen within 
the framework of the cooperative state. Those terms would surely have 
mirrored the credit market terms that would have emerged when some 
taxpayers choose to arrange private loans rather than sell other assets. Is 
it reasonable or plausible to perform the conceptual experiment of replac-
ing a set of private loans with a politically administered loan program, 
and conclude in Ricardian fashion that nothing of any significance has 
changed? As an act of creative imagination, anything is always imaginable. 
As an exercise in plausible reasoning (Polya, 1954), however, it strains all 
credulity to assert that the replacement of a network of market loans with 
public debt will have no other effect than to induce changes in individual 
balance sheets, with some taxpayers incurring a future liability while other 
taxpayers reduce their present asset holdings.
The officials who guide the activities of democratic entities are not 
residual claimants to their activities. A private lender who mismanages 
the portfolio he manages will suffer a decline in net worth, and could even 
become insolvent and file for bankruptcy. This outcome is impossible for 
democratic entities. Mismanagement is obviously possible, but it manifests 
itself  as a cost to taxpayers and not as a cost to enterprise managers, 
reflecting Wagner’s (2016) recognition that politics is a peculiar and not an 
ordinary form of business activity. Furthermore, democratic polities are 
riven with margins of heterogeneity whereby gains to some people entail 
losses to others. For instance, de Viti thought in terms of a flat rate of tax 
on all income. Contemporary tax systems, however, exempt a great deal of 
income from the tax base. Within the United States, for instance, roughly 
half  the adult population is exempt from the federal income tax. To the 
extent that borrowing enables an increase in public expenditure within 
what is clearly a semi-cooperative democracy, debt-financed expenditure 
will to some extent be self-repudiating and not self-extinguishing.
A SIDEBAR REMARK ON CAPITAL BUDGETING
Fiscal and budgetary scholars often distinguish between current and capi-
tal budgeting. The central idea in advancing this distinction is to create a 
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separation between those objects of expenditure that are used up during the 
current year and those that provide service over several years. The capital 
budgeting idea would place what are judged to be capital expenditures into 
separate accounts that are amortized over some suitable number of years. 
Each year, the appropriate amount for amortization would be transferred 
to the current budget. Within this budgetary format, current spending 
would be financed by taxation and capital spending would be financed by 
public debt. Capital budgeting is often practiced by corporations, and the 
extension of capital budgeting to governments would seem to be little more 
than the extension of good business practices to governments.
Once it is recognized that government are peculiar forms of business 
(Wagner, 2016), capital budgeting can easily be misused. The institutional 
arrangements by which commercial corporations are governed render 
them as instances of cooperative collectivities in de Viti’s sense. This is not 
the case with democratic polities. Suppose the capital budgeting idea is 
inserted into a democratic political constitution. The first issue that must 
be faced is how to distinguish between current and capital expenditures. 
Not far behind making this distinction is the need to determine the period 
of time over which capital expenditures will be amortized. Also to be 
determined is the locus of responsibility and capacity for making these 
determinations. In modern, large-scale polities, we may be sure that such 
determinations will not be made by some such abstract notion of ‘the 
citizenry’. They will be made by bureaucratic officials and legislators and 
in an environment where knowledge is concentrated among intensely 
interested insiders to the activities in question.
To illustrate in stark relief  the problem of inherent ambiguity that 
capital budgeting entails in democratic polities, consider an agency that is 
confined by a balanced budget requirement when the head of the agency 
would like to take his managerial staff  on a week-long retreat in some 
remote venue. The balanced budget requirement would prevent this activ-
ity. Such activity might, however, pass muster in the presence of capital 
budgeting. What would be necessary is to classify the retreat as an invest-
ment in enhancing future performance. In this respect, it could be claimed 
that it is necessary to gain emotional distance from daily organizational 
activities for management to be able calmly and systematically to evaluate 
approaches to agency reorganization that would improve future perform-
ance. What is in play, then, is a claim that such a current expenditure 
should be classified as a capital item, so should be incorporated into a 
capital budget, with the expense amortized over some period of years. 
While this example might seem a bit far-fetched, it points all the same to 
recognition that the distinction between current and capital expenditures 
contains unavoidable margins of arbitrariness. In light of those unavoid-
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able margins of ambiguity, political officials will have margins of action 
along which they can classify actions to promote their desires.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although in democracy government plays an intermediary role, this 
intermediation is different from that developed in de Viti’s cooperative 
model. In a democratic model, taxpayers and subscribers are not the same 
and government intermediation is a process that interconnects a share 
of the population (taxpayers) with another share (subscribers). As we 
have already seen, while in a cooperative model taxpayers and subscribers 
are the same individuals, it is not so in the democratic model and also in 
the case of external public debt. The latter two cases lead us to conclude 
that there isn’t any automatic extinction of the debt. Contrary to the 
pre-democratic model, where the sovereign debt was a personal debt,6 in 
the democratic model, where the parliamentary assembly creates public 
debt in the name and on behalf  of taxpayers, public debt also raises ethical 
issues. While the Ricardian equivalence theorem is not a good fit for the 
democratic model, de Viti’s non-equivalence theorem is a good fit because 
it also incorporates the expenditure side into his model. De Viti does not 
conceive of public debt as an ordinary rational problem, for he associates 
public debt with extraordinary economic crisis. Thus, economic crisis 
raises intertemporal and not intergenerational issues because public debt is 
not shifted to future generations. But we believe that the economic crisis/
debt is at once de Viti’s strong point and his Achilles heel. The crisis, in 
fact, is not so much the result of an intentional project of transferring costs 
to future generations as it is the inexorable outcome of politically directed 
choices inside institutional arrangements that escape the confines of the 
cooperative state.
To de Viti, the economic crisis has, in fact, its origin in a wrong evaluation 
of the investments that have yielded lower levels of benefits than expected. 
However, this is only part of the story. De Viti conceives of the crisis as 
a failure in investments presuming that all public expenditures financed 
through debt are employed in investments without considering that the 
government has a proclivity to wasteful expenditures, for it is guided by 
the conviction that public debt is less costly than an extraordinary tax and 
even an ordinary tax.
6 On this see Eusepi and Wagner (2012).
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